



The cases are remarkably in accord that, in the absence of enabling
statute, an unincorporated association cannot sue or be sued in the
common or association name. Like unanimity substantially obtains
in the reason assigned for the general rule. The following excerpts
are cited as typical:
"Since a partnership is not a person, either natural or artificial, it can-
not sue as a party plaintiff in the firm name." Lister v. Vowell (1898)
122 Ala. 264, 267, 25 So. 564, 565.
"As we have said, the plaintiffs have undertaken to make three unin-
corporated labor unions parties defendant. That is an impossibility.
There is no such entity known to the law as an unincorporated associa-
tion, and consequently it cannot be made a party defendant." Pickett
v. Walsh (19o6) 192 Mass. 572, 589, 78 N. E. 753, 76o.
"A voluntary association, being only a collection of individuals, could
not, at common law, sue or be sued by its associated name .. ...
Lewelling v. Woodworkers Underwriters (1919) 14o Ark. 124, 128,
215 S. W. 258, 259.
"There is no principle better settled than that an unincorporated
association cannot, in absence of a statute authorizing it, be sued in
its society or company name, but all the members must be made parties,
since such bodies have, in the absence of statute, no legal entity distinct
from their members." Baskins v. United Mine Workers (1921) 15o
Ark. 398, 4Ol, 234 S. W. 464, 465.1
'In addition to the cases quoted from, other representative cases are: Grand
Int'l. Bro. Loco. Engineers v. Green (1921) 206 Ala. I96, 89 So. 435; Barbour v.
Albany Lodge (1884) 73 Ga. 474; Hanley v. Elm Grove Mut. Tel. Co. (191I)
15o Iowa, I98, 129 N. W. 8o7; Soper v. Clay City Lumber Co. (1899) 21 Ky. L.
933, 53 S. W. 267; Kimball v. Lower Columbia Fire Assoc. (1913) 67 Or. 249,
135 Pac. 877; Metropolitan St. v. Adams Express Co. (i9io) 145 Mo. App. 371,
130 S. W. IOI; Payne v. Livingston (1923, Tex. Civ. App.) 253 S. W. 701;
Maisch v. Order of Americus (i9o9) 223 Pa. 199, 72 Ati. 528; Wharton v.
Warner (1913) 75 Wash. 470, 135 Pac. 235; Dicey, Parties to Actions (2d Am.
ed. 1886) i69, 285; Wrightington, Unincorporated Associations (2d ed. 1923)
136, 425; 22 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 230, 242; 4 Cyc. 313; 5 C. J. 1365, 1369; 3 Ann.
Cas. 699, note.
An enabling statute expressly authorizing suits in the common name has been
said "to constitute the association an entity, at least for the purposes of the
litigation." Bro. of Ry. Trainmen v. Cook (192o, Tex. Civ. App.) 221 S. W.
1O49. But see Start, C. J., in Dimond v. Minn. Say. Bank (1897) 70 Minn. 298,
300, 73 N. W. 182.
It is not to be overlooked that there are some cases in which the reason
for the general rule is placed on the ground of lack of certainty of the parties
litigant. Reid & Co. v. McLeod (1852) 2o Ala. 576; Blackwell v. Reid & Co.
(1866) 4I Miss. 102, Holland v. Butler (1839, Ind.) 5 Blackf. 255; Cady V.
Smith (1882) 12 Neb. 628, 12 N. W. 95; and see i Chitty, Pleading, *256;
Bentley v. Smith (1805, N. Y.) 3 Caines, 170; cf. Armstrong v. Robinson
(1833, Md.) 5 GilL & J. 412.
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In the famous case of United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co.,2
although there was no statute expressly authorizing suits against unin-
corporated labor unions in their union names, the United States Supreme
Court found authority therefor by implication from the fact that state
and Federal statutes have been enacted touching labor unions in various
respects. The court found "affirmative legal recognition of their exist-
ence" by these general statutory provisions. Their "existence" being
thus "recognized" they are suable in their association names.3
In reading the foregoing assignments-of-reason for the general rule
and the method of approach of the Supreme Court in the Coronado
case, one naturally raises questions like these: (i) If an unincorpo-
rated association is only a collection of individuals, if it is not a legal
entity separate and distinct from its members, why can it not sue and be
sued? Is not it, they? (2) By what provocation is the question con-
sidered whether an unincorporated association is or is not a legal entity?
(3) Why is not an unincorporated association a "legal entity" in these
cases? (4) How is it material whether or not statutes "recognize"
the "existence" of the unincorporated association in these cases?
Before attempting to answer these questions specifically, it is worth
while to point out a common law corollary to the general rule stated
above. That is to the effect that all the members in their several names
must appear as parties, plaintiff or defendant, as the case may be. A
non-joinder is cause for abatement.'
In early times perhaps this corollary worked no serious harm. Firms
or associations were small in membership, and their creditors or other
plaintiffs had reasonable opportunity to know or ascertain an entire
membership, even their Christian and ancestral names, without resort to
initials, if necessary. In modem times, however, its hardship has
become more serious. In the Coronado case the defendant association
2(I921) 259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 57O.
' In this method of approach the Supreme Court followed the highest courts
of Great Britain in the Taff Vale case [igor, H. L.] A. C. 426. The position
taken by the court has been characterized as "startling, in view of precedent."
NoTEs (1923) 5 Is. L. QuavR. i26, and as a "radical change in common law
procedure." Magill, The Suability of Labor Unions (1922) I N. C. L. REv. 8r, 85.
"O'Connell v. Lamb (1895) 63 Ill. App. 652; Wrightington, op. cit. supra
note I. secs. 23, 70; 1 Rowley, Modern Law of Partnership (1916) secs. 495, 496;
I Chitty, op. cit. supra note 1, *12, *42; and see Moore v2. Stemmons (i9o6)
119 MO. App. 362, 95 S. W. 313; Donovan v. Danielson (1923, Mass.) I38 N. E.
81i. For the rule in tort cases see Dicey, op. cit. supra note 1, Rules ioi, iig.
In many states statutes provide in effect that "joint" obligations generally are
"joint and several" and in many states obligations of partners are made "joint
and several." Rowley, loc. cit. supra.
Whether either class of statutes applies to unincorporated associations not
for profit-where the members are not partners-is matter of statutory con-
struction. It has been asserted that the individual members of such association
are "jointly and severally liable as principals" on contracts to which they assent.
7 A. L. R. 222, note. But see i Williston, Contracts (I92O) 6o7.
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represented approximately 450,000 persons. What an economic loss
of time, labor and printing paper to require the nomination of each
member by his Christian and ancestral name before the plaintiff can
have his cause heard in a common law court! If plaintiff's cause of
action is in tort, however, the corollary rule is not controlling. He
may sue one, some, probably, or all for each one's own tort. If, how-
ever, the plaintiff's claim soars to $6ooooo or more, for example, as it
did in the Coronado case, it will stand him in hand, as a practical matter,
to join as many responsible defendants as possible to assure satisfaction
of his execution. If all the associates are responsible on one basis or
another for the wrong to the plaintiff and if it were accomplished while
endeavoring to further their association purposes, their wrongful action
may be said to be an "association wrong" and their responsibility an
"association responsibility." Since they have assumed an association
name it applies to them in the given wrongful action and responsibility.
Why must plaintiff be put to loss of time and labor and other expense
in naming all by their several names as an alternative to proceeding
against a lesser number with his chances for satisfaction of his execution
diminished pro tanto?
If only a part of the associates are responsible to the plaintiff obvi-
ously there is no "association responsibility." Plaintiff's claim, then,
is against so many individuals; their several names are their only
names pro hac vice and plaintiff must proceed accordingly.5
If the plaintiff adopts the alternative of proceeding against only a
portion of the associates further loss may be realized when he seeks
to have execution against their shares of the "association property."
The statement is made in the Coronado case that, "To remand persons
injured to a suit against each of the 400,000 members to recover damages
and to levy on his share of the strike fund, would be to leave them
remediless."' This is readily enough appreciated, and makes the matter
no worse than it is by assuming that each member has a several interest
in the strike fund which can be levied upon. If the unincorporated
'Of course it might happen that all the associates would physically engage
in, or otherwise become responsible for, a tortious act against a plaintiff but
without the common purpose of furthering their associate enterprise. They
might, for example, join with the community in a riot If so, again there would
be no "association wrong." They would be joint tort-feasors only, with no
common name applicable to them in the given situation.
In a case where the plaintiff's cause of action sounds in contract and in the
given jurisdiction the obligation is "joint and several" by statute, the corollary
rule does not control any more than in the tort cases. But the same practical
considerations require that as many responsible associates as possible be joined
to assure collection of the judgment. If plaintiff claims on an "association
contract," i. e., on one by which all the associates are responsible, why should
he be put to the expense of nominating all of them in their several names in order
to have all of them defendants, when the given transaction is one for which the
associates have assumed a common name by which they are to be designated?
'Supra note 2, at p. 389, 42 Sup. Ct. at p. 576. (italics mine.)
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labor union is deemed a "business" enterprise wherefore the incidents
of "tenancy in partnership" attach, undoubtedly, by the rules of part-
nership law, each member does have an interest, more or less valuable,
in the common fund which his creditors may get in one way or another.
The Minnesota Court has emphatically declared, however, that labor
unions are not business associations for profit.7 Whatever may be the
proper classification of labor unions, there is the non-business class of
unincorporated associations in which the associates are not partners,
where the incidents of "tenancy in partnership" cannot be said to obtain,
and where, it would appear, the members have no several interest in
the common fund which creditors of the individual member can secure.
The incidents of ownership of such common property may be referred
to perhaps as "tenancy in non-partnership associations." In absence
of express provision to the contrary, the associate is under disability
to sell or transfer his interest in the common property.8 Upon with-
drawal from membership his interest is extinguished, by beneficial
survivorship to the remaining associates.' Upon death his interest is
likewise extinguished.' 0 Also on dissolution, the then living members
take the whole, after creditors are satisfied, probably, to the exclusion
of former members or their heirs.11 The proprietary interest of the
associate, while such, is the right that the common property be used
'St. Paul Typothetae v. Bookbinders' Union (igo5) 94 Minn. 351, lO2 N. W.
725-strictly a question of statutory construction, however, Cf. Fitzpatrick v.
Int'l. Typo. Union (I92I) 149 Minn. 4O, 184 N. W. 17; Diamond Block Coal
Co. v. United Mine Workers (ig2o) I88 Ky. 477, 487, 222 S. W. 1079, 1084;
Pacific Typesetting Co. v. Int'l. Typo. Union (1923, Wash.) 216 Pac. 358;
Herald v. Glendale Lodge (1920) 46 Calif. App. 325, 189 Pac. 329, and Vann, J.,
in Ostrom v. Greene (igoo) 161 N. Y. 353, 36o, 55 N. E. 919, 921.
'Branagan v. Buckman (191o, Spec. T.) 67 Misc. 242, 122 N. Y. Supp. 61o;
Detroit Light Guard Band v. First Mich. Indep. Inf. Band (1903) 96 N. W.
934, 134 Mich. 598; see also Moore v. Hillsdale City Tel. Co. (1912) 17, Mich.
388, 137 N. W. 241; McFadden v. Murphy (1889) 149 Mass. 341, 21 N. E. 868;
O'Neill v. Delaney (i9o9, Sup. Ct. S. T.) 158 N. Y. Supp. 665. If the constitu-
tion-by-law-agreement provides therefor, the member has the power to alienate
subject thereto. Nashua Say. Bank v. Abbott (19o2) 181 Mass. 531, 63 N. E.
lo58; Belton v. Hatch (1888) lO9 N. Y. 593, 17 N. E. 225.
'Burt v. Oneida Community (1893) 137 N. Y. 346, 33 N. E. 3o7; Clark v.
Brown (19o8, Tex. Civ. App.) 1o8 S. W. 421; Local Union v. Barrett (1896)
19 R. I. 663, 36 At. 5; Curtiss v. Hoyt (1848) ip Conn. 154; Mo. Bottlers'
Assoc. v. Fennerty (1899) 81 Mo. App. 525 (expelled for cause) ; Lawson v.
Hewel (1897) 118 Calif. 613, 50 Pac. 763; see McLaughlin v. Wall (igog) 81
Kan. 2o6, 1O5 Pac. 33.
) "Goesele v. Bimler (1852, U. S.) 14 How. 589; Everitt v. Duss (1913, C. C.
A. 3d) 2o6 Fed. 590; see also Mason v. Atlanta Fire Co. (1883) 70 Ga. 6o4.
Sommers v. Reynolds (1894) io3 Mich. 3o7, 61 N. W. 5oi; and see Schiller
Commandery No. i v. Jaennichen (18g8) 116 Mich. 129, 74 N. W. 458; cf.
Walters v. Pittsburgh & Lake Angeline Iron Co. (1918) 2Ol Mich. 379, 167
N. W. 834. See also Parks v. Knickerbocker Trust Co. (1gio, zst Dept) 137
App. Div. 719, 122 N. Y. Supp. 521; Everitt v. Duss (1912, W. D. Pa.) 197
Fed. 4O.
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consistently with the purposes of the association.
12 With the member's
interest of such nature in this class of associations it is hard to see
what his creditor can procure as "his share" of the common fund. In
a common law court, if he proceeds against less than all of the associ-
ates and if he establishes other than an "association responsibility," it
would seem that he is remediless as to the association funds.
13
The Court of Chancery early took into account the foregoing con-
siderations, especially the hardships caused by the corollary to our
general rule, and invented so-called representative actions.
14 In causes
properly cognizable by the Chancellor a few members are made parties
plaintiff or defendant as representative of all. The representatives
are deemed to represent the association, that is, all the associates, and
the decree or judgment which determines their rights, concludes all
as respects the common interest.1 5
With modern codes and their provision for one "civil action" it may
be hoped, and to some degree expected, according to recent authori-
ties, that this heretofore exclusively equitable procedure will be chosen
for any case involving unincorporated associations of substantial
membership.16
'Myrick v. Holmes (192I) 151 Ga. 437, 107 S. E. 324; Kalbitzer v. Goodhue
(1903) 52 W. Va. 435, 44 S. E. 264; Clark v. Brown, supra note 9. If this right
plus the conditional right to share in the property if he is a living member at
final dissolution can be said to be an "interest," it is virtually worthless to his
creditor.
" See Driscoll v. Hoyt (1858, Mass.) ii Gray, 404.
"Bromley v. Williams (1863, Ch.) 32 Beav. 177; Story, Equity Pleading
(9th ed. i866) sec. 97. Ibid. sec. io7: "In cases of this sort the persons inter-
ested are commonly numerous, and any attempt to unite them all would be,
even if practicable, exceedingly inconvenient, and would subject the proceedings
to the danger of perpetual abatements, and other impediments, arising from
intermediate deaths, or other accidents, or changes of interest."
'Fitzpatrick v. Rutter (1896) 16o Ill. 282 43 N. E. 392; Bushong v. Taylor
(1884) 82 Mo. 66o; Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs (i915) 237 U. S. 662, 35 Sup.
Ct. 692. See also Oster v. Brotherhood of Loco. F. & E. (192) 271 Pa. 419,
114 At. 377. Cf. Am. Steel Co. v. Wire Drawers' Union (1898, C. C. N. D.
Ohio, E. D.) go Fed. 598; Spaulding v. Evenson (19o6, C. C. E. D. Wash.) i49
Fed. 913.
'""One object of the code in abolishing the distinction between actions at law
and suits in equity, and prescribing the same method of procedure for the
prosecution of both, evidently was to simplify judicial proceedings, and facilitate
the administration of justice; and, to accomplish that end, its provisions, and
proceedings under them, should receive that liberal construction which it is
expressly required shall be given them. To restrain the application of section
5008, to actions of a purely equitable nature, would, we think, be at variance with
its language, and the general spirit and purpose of the code." Platt v. Colvin
(1893) 50 Ohio St. 703, 711, 36 N. E. 735, 738 (representative plaintiffs).
Accord: Branson v. L W. W. (19o8) 3o Nev. 270, 95 Pac. 354 (representative
defendants). Decision on this point is expressly reserved in Baskins v. United
Mine Workers (1921) 15o Ark. 398, 234 S. W. 464.
In Liederkranz Singing Soc. v. Germania T.-V. (1894) 163 Pa. 265, 268, 29
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But while the general rule stands with its corollary, and though its
hardships and inconveniences remain unmitigated by Code provisions,
still perhaps a change should be resisted. A rule of law may be so
uniformly pronounced, that despite its logical imperfection and actual
inconvenience, it is better to leave it undisturbed than to upset the
status quo. This consideration demands attention if our daily affairs
have become adjusted to the enormity. Has the general rule under
consideration any such pervading effect? It is believed not, in the
light of its application by the courts. Although it is very uniformly
recited that suits in the common name cannot be maintained--even that
it is an impossibility-this is only extravagance of expression. And
so the Massachusetts Court in Pickett v. Walsh, quoted from at the
outset, to the effect that it is an "impossibility" to sue unincorporated
labor unions in their common name, remarks in a subsequent portion
of the opinion: "A trade union was nade a party defendant in
Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, and the anomaly seems to have
escaped attention. 1 1 7 What is this "impossibility" which can be done if
done unconsciously? Likewise, it is at times asserted that the defect
goes to the "jurisdiction" of the court :1" "There must be a suable party
before the court.. A suable party is essential to jurisdiction whether
by compulsory writ or voluntary submission." This was provoked by
a special appearance to move to quash summons and pleading in abate-
ment because the union was named defendant in the union name. In
most cases where such language is used the question of suability has
been seasonably raised, or the case rests on more serious grounds. 19
By most of the authorities, the designation of an unincorporated
association as a party litigant in its common name, is deemed to be
only a formal procedural defect. If not taken as a matter of abatement,
Atl. 918, gig, this position is taken: "It is necessary that the suit should be
brought on behalf of all the parties in interest, but this may as well be done,
in substance, by using the general name which describes them all, as by the
phrase, 'in behalf of themselves and all others interested,'" there being no plea
in abatement. And see Branson v. I. W. W., supra; St. Germain v. Bakery
Workers' Union (97) 97 Wash. 282, 166 Pac. 665.
27 192 Mass. at p. 590, 78 N. E. at p. 761. Like anomalies are common. See
for example: Barr v. Essex Trades Council (1894) 53 N. J. Eq. IOI, 30 At.
881; So. Ry. v. Machinists, Union (igol, C. C. W. D. Tenn.) 111 Fed. 49, 58, note.
Grand Bro. of Eng. v. Green (1921) 2o6 Ala. 196, 198, 89 So. 435, 436.
For example, the Kentucky Court in Soper v. Clay City Lumber Co., supra
note i, declares: "The appellee, not being a corporation, it had no existence
in fact and in law as would enable the plaintiff to sue it in the name of Clay
City Lumber Company .... Such a judgment is void." The judgment here
was by default, taken after service had on a former agent of a dead man who
had done business in Kentucky under the above name. Obviously the court
was without jurisdiction to render the personal judgment, but not necessarily
for the reason assigned. But see Paine's Chapel v. Aberdeen Realty Co. (igig)
120 Miss. 12, 81 So. 65o.
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it is waived forever.2 0  But as to the precise nature of that defect, as to
its specification for the pleader, there is remarkable lack of uniformity,
as indicated in the note.
2 1
-'Agr. Ext. Club. v. Hirsch & Son (1919) 39 Calif. App. 433, 179 Pac. 43o;
Herald v. Glendale Lodge, supra note 6; Dorsey v. Lawrence & Co. (i8o8, Ky.)
Hardin, 508; Moore v. Martin & Hoyt Co. (19oo) 124 Ala. 291, 27 So. 252;
Johnson & Co. v. Smith (1841, Iowa) i Morris, Io5; Pate v. Bacon & Co.
(188, Va.) 6 Munf. 219; Barnes & Co. v. Chicago Typo. Union (igo8) 232
Ill. 402, 83 N. E. 932; Krug Furn. Co. v. Berlin Union (1903) 5 Ont. L. 463;
Cady v. Smith, supra note i; Deems v. Albany & Canal Line (1878, C. C. S. D.
N. Y.) 7 Fed. Cas. No. 3736; Mitchell & Bro. v. Railton (891) 45 Mo. App.
273; Iron Moulders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co. (i9O8, C. C. A. 7th) 166 Fed.
45; Rogers v. Verlander (1888) 30 W. Va. 61g, 5 S. E. 847; Morgridge v. Stoeffer
(9o5) 14 N. D. 43o, io4 N. W. iiI; (ig2i) 20 MicrE. L. REv. 245; cases infra
note 21. See also Crawley v. Am. Society of Equity (1913) 153 Wis. 13, 139
N. W. 734; Branson v. L W. W., supra note 16.
Within the rules of the conflict of laws the question is one of "procedure."
Saunders v. Adams Express Co. (1904) 71 N. J. L. 270, 57 Atl. 899. Cf. Ruth v.
Lowery & Upton (i88o) io Neb. 260, 4 N. W. 977.
In the following cases, however, the objection was deemed not waived at time
raised: At the trial: Hughes v. Walker, Carter & Co. (1835, Ind.) 4 Blackf.
50; Barbour v. Albany Lodge (1884) 73 Ga. 474; Weisz v. Davey (i89o) 28
Neb. 566, 44 N. W. 470. See also McConnell v. Apollo Say. Bank (1892) 146
Pa. 79, 23 Atl. 347; objection first made on appeal: Proprietors of the Mex.
Mill v. Yellow Jacket Min. Co. (1868) 4 Nev. 40, distinguished in Branson v.
L W. W., supra note 16. And see Simpson v. Grand Int. Bro. of Loco. Engi-
neers (1919) 83 W. Va. 355, 98 S. E. 58o.
Some cases also indicate that the defect is not subject to amendment. Hajeck
v. Bohemian-Slavonian Benev. Soc. (1896) 66 Mo. App. 568; Barbour v. Albany
Lodge, supra note i. Contra: Morgridge v. Stoeffer, supra, at p. 432, 104
N. W. at p. 1113, "The partnership name furnished the means of identify-
ing the plaintiffs, and it cannot therefore be said that the firm name was
the same as no name;" Kleinert v. Knoop (19o7) 147 Mich. 387, 110o N. W.
941; see also Loewenberg v. Gilliam & Lyon (19o4) 72 Ark. 314, 79 S. W. io64.
Where the complaint is dismissed of course judgment must be for "dismissal
of the complaint," and not judgment for defendant "who has no legal existence."
Hajeck v. Bohemian Benev. Soc., supra; but is, of course, "without prejudice."
Fox v. Blue Grass Grocery (igoi) 22 Ky. L. 1695, 60 S. W. 414.
In case of default judgment the defect is reversible error. Simmons v. Titche
Bros. (1894) 102 Ala. 317, 14 So. 786; cf. Seymour v. Thomas Harrow Co.
(1887) 81 Ala. 250, 1 So. 45; Burden v. Cross (1870) 33 Tex. 685; Day v.
Cushman, Eaton & Co. (1838) 2 Ill. 475; Dunham v. Shindler (1889) 17 Or.
256, 20 Pac. 326.
' The defect has been treated as:
i. No legal capacity to sue: Union Wiine Co. v. Green (19o9, Spec. T.) 62
Misc. 551, 115 N. Y. Supp. 921; Grolier Soc. v. Foster (1922) i1O Kan. 306,
203 Pac. 920; Agr. Ext. Club. v. Hirsch & Sot, supra note 2o; Pollock v.
Dunning (1876) 54 Ind. 15; Franklin Union v. People (i9o6) 220 Ill. 355, 77
N. E. 176. See also Barnes & Co. v. Chicago Typo. Union, supra note 20;
Brookmire & Co. v. Rosa (1892) 34 Neb. 227, 5I N. W. 840.
z Misnomer: See Porter v. Cresson (1823, Pa.) io Serg. & R. 257; cf.
Seely v. Schenck & Denise (i8o6, N. J. Sup. Ct.) i Penn. 75.
3. Nonjoinder of parties in interest: Burden v. Cross, supra note 20; Hays Vi.
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The chief irritant, or factor promoting this confusion, however,
appears to be the idea that an unincorporated association is not a
"person," not a "legal entity separate from its members." With this
we may revert to the question proposed at the beginning of this article:
By what provocation is the question considered whether or not an
unincorporated association is a legal entity in these cases?
A single individual, without renouncing his ancestral and christian
name, may adopt an additional name and therein incur and enjoy legal
relations. 2 2 The courts concern themselves in identifying him, the
human being, with the legal relation in question. They approach the
problem in that manner. Such single individual, also, can sue 23 and
can be sued in such assumed name. "The replication to a plea of
misnomer, that a party is as well known by one name as another, is
good." 24  It is considered that he is sufficiently named, it being the
name which he and third persons have used to designate him. That
such name is not fairly susceptible of being that of a person, but rather
is "artificial," appears to make no difference. 25
If a number of individuals associate or come together and co-operate
in a common purpose, and take unto themselves an association name
pro hac vice, what is its significance? If plaintiff sells goods to the
authorized agent of the associates, but extends credit to the association
name, he is .deemed by the courts to have given credit to "the individ-
uals, whom, upon inquiry, should be found to stand behind it."28
Lanier (1833, Ind.) 3 Blackf. 321; Cf. Armstrong v. R. & T. Robinson (1833,
Md.) 5 Gill. & J. 412 and Blackwell v. Reed, supra note i.
4. Lack of certainty of parties: See cases supra note i, especially Blackwell
v. Reed. See also Moore v. Martin & Hoyt Co., supra note 2o.
5. That Christian and ancestral names must appear on record: Livingston v.
Harvey (1858) io Ind. 218; Day v. Cushman, Eaton & Co., supra note 2o.
In some cases, no name is given to the defect to guide the pleader for time
had passed to take advantage of a "formal defect," while in other cases the
court indifferently treats it as any one of several. See Herald v. Glendale
Lodge, supra note 6.
L. R. A. 1915 D, 983, note. N. IL. sec. 18.
'Roberts v. Mosier (1913) 35 Okla. 69i, 132 Pac. 678 (elaborately reviewing
the problem); Sheridan v. Nation (igoo) 159 Mo. 27, 59 S. W. 972; Clark v.
Clark (1878) 29 Kan. 522; Baumeister & Co. v. Markham (1897) ioi Ky. i22,
39 S. W. 844, 41 S. W. 816; Cooper v. Burr (1865, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 45 Barb. 9;
see also Bank of Havana v. Magee (1859) 2o N. Y. 355.
"Lucas v. Farrington (1858) 21 IIl. 31 (headnote); Selman & Co. v. Shackle-
ford (855) 17 Ga. 615; Miller v. George (1889) 30 S. C. 526, 9 S. E. 659;
Conway v. Hays (1844, Ind.) 7 Blackf. 159. And see Linch v. Hooke (17o4,
K. B.) i Salk 7.
' Charles v. Valdosta Foundry & Mach. Co. (908) 4 Ga. App. 733, 62 S. E.
493; Bremen Fdry. Works v. McLendon (1917) ig Ga. App. 65o, 9I S. E. 1O49;
29 Cyc. 270, cf. 15 Enc. P1. & Pr. 92g. See also Stange v. Price (1921) 191 Ky.
734, 231 S. W. 532.
"Davison v. Holden (1887) 55 Conn. io3, 112, io Atl. 515, 516. Accord:
Ridgeldv v. Dobson (1842, Pa.) 3 Watts & S. 118. ". ... and this for the public
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The courts have approached the problem in that manner. It would
seem to be a fair and expedient construction of the transaction. Like
conclusion is reached regarding a bill of sale, or chattel mortgage to
the association name. "The Arkansas Machinery & Supply Co. is
not a corporation, but it is the business name of a firm of partners ....
Such a conveyance to a firm is just as effectual as if the name of each
partner had been set out in the mortgage. '27  In case of a mortgage
of real estate to the association name, the rule appears to be, at least
for states having the ."lien theory" so called, that it is of like effect as
the note of which it is "mere security, although in the form of a con-
ditional conveyance," namely a mortgage to the associates. 28  Real
estate leases to an association eo nomine are also sustained as being
such in favor of the members.29  Where decds of land are attempted
to be executed to an unincorporated association in its association name,
the decisions are in some confusion. In a few cases the deed is said
to be void for want of "a competent grantee."3 0  By another class of
convenience, because it would be very troublesome, to say the least, to insert
the names of a whole company in every entry in books, in bills, and on other
mercantile negotiations." Seely v. Schenck & Denise, supra note 21. The same
method of approach obtains with simple contracts generally: Ackermann v.
Ackermann Schuetzen Tierein, (igoo, Tex. Civ. App.) 6o S. W. 366, 368 "....
a right accruing to such an organization in its company name inures to the
benefit of its members ;" Camden, G. & W. Ry. v. Guarantors of Pa. (i896)
59 N. J. L. 328, 35 Atl. 796. A negotiable promissory note payable to "Vernon
Advertising and Manufacturing Company," a partnership name, is not payable
to bearer under sec. 9, N. I. L. as a note payable to a "fictitious or non-existing
person, or when the name of the payee does not purport to be the name of any
person." Write Away Pen Co. v. Buckner (1915) 188 Mo. App. 259, 265, 175
S. W. 81, 84.
"Hendren v. Wing (1895) 6o Ark. 56I, 562, 31 S. W. 149; Kellogg v. Olson
(1885) 34 Minn. lO3, 24 N. W. 364; and see Slaughter v. Doe ex dern. Swift,
Murphy & Co. (188o) 67 Ala. 494. But in Massachusetts an automobile is an
outlaw upon the public highways, if registered only in the name of an unin-
corporated labor union, because it is not registered "by the owner thereof"--
this because such union "has no separate existence in law-unlike a corporation
which is a legal person quite apart from its stockholders." Hanley v. Ant. Ry.
Express Co. (1923, Mass.) 138 N. E. 323, 324. Compare the reference of Rugg,
C. J., of the same court, to Pickett v. Walsh (igo6) 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753,
in Long v. Co-op. League of Am. (1923) 14o N. E. 811, 812. See also People v.
Brander (ig1o) 244 Ill. 26, 91 N. E. 59.
' Chicago Lumber Co. v. Ashworth (1881) 26 Kan. 212; Slaughter v. Doe ex
dein. Swift, Murphy & Co., supra note 27.
'Evans v. Curtis (1826, N. P.) 2 Carr. & P. 296; Reding v. Anderson (1887)
72 Iowa, 498, 34 N. W. 300; Edwards v. Old Settlers' Assoc. (1914, Tex. Civ.
App.) 166 S. W. 423. See also Piper v. Taylor (i922, N. D.) 188 N. W. 171.
' Because of want of a "competent grantee" it is held in the following cases
that the legal title at least is still in the grantor. Harriman v. Southam (1861)
i6 Ind. 19o; Miller Lumber Co. v. Oliver (1896) 65 Mo. App. 435; Douthitt v.
Stinson (1876) 63 Mo. 268; and see Tidd v. Rines (1879) 26 Minn. 2O; cf.
Kellogg v. Olson, supra note 27; East Haddam Church v. East Haddam Society
(1877) 44 Conn. 259. These cases pronounce the formula that since the associa-
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cases the deed is sustained in favor of the members where the firm or
association name contains the name of at least one of the members
although only his ancestral name.3 ' Others take the more cautious
position that legal title vests only in the individual so named, suggesting
that there will be equitable rights in the other members respecting the
property.32
On the other hand, in Byam v. Bick ford3 3 the Massachusetts court
goes the full way in holding that a deed of land to "the South Chelms-
ford Hall Associates," an association of definite membership, operated to
vest the property in those "who were properly described by this title."3 4 It
tion is unincorporated the requirements for a deed are not satisfied, namely,
that there must be a competent grantor and grantee. That the Missouri court,
however, in Douthitt v. Stinson., supra, the only one of the cases that purports
to give the problem careful consideration, used the formula only as a way to
state its conclusion that the grantee was not designated or described with
adequate certainty, is clearly evident from the opinion and the earlier Missouri
case, Arthur v. Weston & Strode (1856) 22 MO. 378, on which it relies.
The early New York cases, Jackson v. Cory (1811, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 8 Johns.
385, and Hornbeck v. Westbrook (1812, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 9 Johns. 73, which are
frequently cited, cannot be relied On to support the foregoing formula as a
reason in itself. In the former case the deed was to "the people of the c6unty
of Otsego," and in the latter "to the inhabitants of the town of Rochester."
Both communities were unincorporated. Both deeds were held void. While
the first case talks of "capacity" of the grantee as well as uncertainty in designa-
tion or description thereof, the latter case is quite explicit that want of certainty
of grantee is the reason for the decision. And see Greene v. Dennis (1826)
6 Conn. 292, 301. These cases may be sound enough where the grantee named
is the population of a geographical area, the group being an indefinite and unas-
certained number. That the problem is one of designation or description of the
grantees with sufficient certainty, rather than a question whether the grantee
has "capacity" or is a "competent grantee" as the issue arises in cases of
felons, aliens, idiots or like persons under disability, should be obvious. See
Sheppard, Touchstone, *236; cf. Comyn's Digest, Capacity, B, i. These cases
will be referred to later. For the extent to which the two foregoing New York
cases have been carried in New York, see Schein v. Erasmus Realty Co. (1920,
2d Dept) 194 App. Div. 38, 184 N. Y. Supp. 840. German Land Assoc. v.
Scholler (1865) 1o Minn. 331, properly interpreted, likewise rests on uncertainty
in the beneficiary; see Society of the Most Precious Blood v. Moll (1892) 51
Minn. 277, 281, 53 N. W. 648, 649.
' Sherry v. Gilmore (1883) 58 Wis. 324, 332, 17 N. W. 252, 255. "A firm name
is always held sufficient to designate the true name of all the persons composing
the firm;" and see Hoffman v. Porter (1824, C. C. 4th) 2 Brock. 156; Menage v.
Burke (1890) 43 Minn. 211, 45 N. W. 155.
*2Arthur v. Weston & Strode, supra note 30, at p. 380: ".... parties may
be described with various degrees of certainty;" Gossett v. Kent (1858) 19 Ark.
602; see also Percifull v. Platt (1880) 36 Ark. 456; Beaman v. Whitney (1841)
2o Me. 413.
(1885) 140 Mass. 31, 2 N. E. 687.
"Accord: Apostolic Holiness Union v. Knudson (I912) 21 Idaho, 589, 123
Pac. 473; Powers v. Robinson & Co. (I89O) 90 Ala.'225, 8 So. io; Sherry v.
Gilmore, supra note 3I; 1 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 192o) sec. 196. By
the Uniform Partnership Act, sec. 8,. (3) and (4), provision is made for convey-
ances to the firm name.
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is quite evident in those cases where the question has been carefully con-
sidered that such courts have been trying to resolve the doubt, remem-
bering our registration statutes and their purposes, whether the
association name designates and describes the members with sufficient
certainty. 5
Cases involving testamentary dispositions to an unincorporated asso-
ciation by its name similarly represent a variety of holdirgs. It has
been held that since the association is unincorporated "it has not capa-
city to take" and that the gift cannot be held to vest in the members
who stand behind their associate name because it would defeat the
testator's intention that the gift should be enjoyed in "perpetual succes-
sion."36  Aside from New York, the tendency is quite evident, how-
ever, to sustain these gifts, especially in case of bequests.
3 7  In New
York the formula is recited that since the association is unincorporated
"it has no capacity to take."38
As to the proper effect to be given to these various formal transac-
tions one feels favorably inclined toward the position of the Irish
Exchequer in La Touche v. Whaley.3 9 The case is this: By deed
defendant assigned a judgment to "Right Honorable David La Touche
& Company," with covenants. Declaration in Covenant thereon by
'For an able and careful consideration of the problem see Arthur v. Weston &
Strode, supra note 30.
"' Greene v. Dennis, supra note 30, at p. 301 (devise) ; Trustees of the Phila:
Baptist Assoc. v. Hart's Ex'rs. (1819, U. S.) 4 Wheat. i (bequest). These cases
involved non-partnership associations and would seem to overlook or uncon-
sciously decide against what were referred to as "incidents of tenancy in
non-partnership associations" earlier in this article. The continued succession
resultant from such ownership would seem to be quite as effective as "corporate'
ownership to afford "continued succession."
" In Guild v. Allen (1907) 28 R. I. 430, 67 Atl. 855, a legacy to an unincorpor-
ated missionary society by its association name is good. "That is, in legal effect,
a gift to the individuals calling themselves by that name." Ibid. at p. 435, 67
AtI. at p. 857. Accord: Estate of Ticknor (1864) 13 Mich. 44, 57 (an able
opinion by Campbell, J.): "We have found no satisfactory authority which
shows why an association, capable of clear identification, is not as capable of
receiving a simple pecuniary bequest for lawful purposes, as a partnership of
purchasing a stock of goods." And see Hartman v. Pendleton (192o) 96 Or.
503, 186 Pac. 57?.
In absence of special controlling policy, such as violation of the rule against
perpetuities (see Lounsbury v. Trustees of Square Lake Assoc. [1912] 170 Mich.
645, 137 N. W. 513), or mortmain (see i Schouler, Wills [6th edL 1923) sec. 35),
it is difficult to see how the problem in cases of devises and bequests differs from
transactions inter vivos, (except possibly a gift to a partnership where continued
succession does not obtain, by the agreement and the purpose of the gift as
intended by the testator would be defeated), namely, whether the association
name designates a definite group of individuals with sufficient certainty either
by nomination or description.
Owens v. Missionary Society (1856) 14 N. Y. 38o. The cases are collected
in 40 Cyc. X052.
(1832) Haynes & Jones, 43.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
plaintiff, John David La Touche, surviving partner of the above named
firm. Demurrer: Plaintiff's name not put in the indenture. Held:
Demurrer overruled :40 "Certum est quod certum reddi potest. This
is not a case in which individuals are neither named nor described; but
one in which though not named they are sufficiently described ....
Here the covenant is not with David La Touche alone, but with him
and his patners. They, it is true, are not set forth nominatim, but
they are described as partners in trade with him. And we hold here,
that persons may be made parties to a deed, by such a description as
will enable them to be accurately ascertained by averment."
Whatever may be hoped for in the development of the rule with
respect to deeds of land and testamentary dispositions, it is significant
to notice that in the foregoing transactions the courts have generally
concerned themselves with the question whether or not the association
name is a certain designation, by nomination or description, of the
associates. If the association name refers to the members in such cases,
why should it so uniformly signalize a non-existing legal entity when
that name is sought to be placed upon the records as a party litigant?
If the association name nominates or describes the associates whether
with more or less certainty in the case of a contract, deed, and testa-
mentary disposition, why does it connote a non-existing "legal person"
in these actions-cases ?
With the foregoing analogies for premises, logic would bring us to
the conclusion that the association name is merely an additional name
assumed by each and all of the members as their own pro hac vice and
that such name should be treated in the case of a number of individuals
the same as an additional name taken on by a single individual.
But, again, "a page of history is worth a volume of logic," it is
believed, in ascertaining the basis and real reason of the general rule
under consideration. It is orthodox in our common law that "corpo-
rate rights" lie in grant from the King. To pretend to be a corporation
without privilege is cause for Quo Warranto.41  The troublesome
problem to the King's courts has been to determine what constitutes
usurping "corporate rights." Lord Eldon, in referring to Rex v.
Webb 4 2 remarks: ". . . . it would have been fortunate, if the court
had then looked at this as a distinct question, and had been good enough
'To like effect see: Maugham v. Sharpe (1864) 17 C. B. (N. s.) 443; Moiler
& Moller v. Lambert (181o, C. P.) 2 Camp. 548. But see Brazilay v. Loewenthal
(igog, ist Dept.) 134 App. Div. 502, iig N. Y. Supp. 612 re specialty contracts;
cf. NoTEs (1923) 23 Coi. L. REv. 663.
" See 3 Holdsworth, History English Law (3d ed. 1923) 476. This tradition
was vitalized by the Bubble Act, (1719) 6 Geo. I, c. 18 touching " . . . all acting
or pretending to act as a corporate body or bodies." This was repealed by
(1825) 6 Geo. IV, c. 9r. See also Duvergier v. Fellows (1828, C. P.) 5 Bing. 248,
at p. 267; I Angell and Ames, Private Corporations (ioth ed. 1875) ch. 2.
' (1811, K. B.) 14 East, 406.
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to declare 'this is not acting as a corporation, because to act as a
corporation you must do so and so.' 43
It is quite clear however, that several individuals by associating
together for business or other common purposes, and taking an asso-
ciation name were not guilty of an illegal assumption of "corporate
rights."" To pass the question of privilege of the group to carry on
business in the common name, we find that when the group came to
the King's court "as such," or sought to put the association name upon
the records as a party litigant, that was deemed to be acting as a corpora-
tion and the associates not being "incorporated," the courts refused to
accord them the power so to sue or the liability to be sued in such
manner and form. In I8O2 we have Lord Eldon's opinion as follows: 5
"It is the absolute duty of Courts of Justice not to permit persons,
not incorporated, to affect to treat themselves as a corporation upon
the Records . . . . I desire my ground to be understood distinctly.
I do not think, the court ought to permit persons, who can only sue as
partners, to sue in a corporate character; and that is the effect of
this bill."
A similar position is taken in other cases:
"This is a number of persons taking to themselves a fictitious name,
and by that name, protruding themselves into a court of justice ....
But by this assumed name, they cannot appear in a court of justice.
They can neither sue nor be sued by it. This is a privilege appertain-
ing to corporate bodies only . . . . To sue and be sued, in their cor-
porate name, is one of the great privileges granted to corporate bodies.
It can only be authorized by the supreme power of the State." 4
"It is too plain for any argument that they [two unincorporated
labor unions in their union name] cannot be so sued. The right to
sue and be sued is a corporate franchise .... ,,47
"3Kinder v. Taylor (1825) 3 L. J. Ch. 68.
"Tindal, C. J., in Harrison v. Heathorn (1843, C. P.) 6 Man. & G. 81, 128,
and Garrard v. Hardey (1843, C. P.) 5 Man. & G. 471, 481; Turner, L. J., in
In the Matter of the Mexican & So. An.- Co. (859, Ch.) 4 De Gex & J. 544,
555; Kirkpatrick, C. J., in Seely v. Schenck & Denise, supra note 21; Dwight,
Legality of Trusts (1888) 3 POL. SCI. QUART. 592.
'Lloyd v. Loaring (1802, Ch.) 6 Ves. 773, 777. Accord: Pipe v. Bateman
(855, Iowa) i Clarke, 369, followed in Westbrook v. Griffin (i9o6) 132 Iowa,
185, Iog N. W. 608; Willes, J., in Hybart v. Parker (1858) 4 C. B. (N. s.) 209,
2r2, quoted by Rogers, J., in Roberts v. Anderson (1915, C. C. A. 2d) 26 Fed. 7,
12; 1 Daniel, Chancery Pleading and Practice (8th ed. 1914) 56; Story, Equity
Pleading (9th ed. 1866) sec. 497, note, quoted with approval in Donovan v.
Danielson (1923, Mass.) 138 N. E. 811, 813; and see Dwight, op. cit. supra note
39, at p. 61o, point (4) of his summary.
"Seely v. Schenck & Denise, supra note 21. Quoted with approval in Richar-
son v. Smith & Co. (i885) 21 Fla. 336, 341; see also Crawley v. Am. Society of
Equity (913) 152 Wis. 1i6, 139 N. W. 734; and Vann, J., in Ostrom v. Greene,
supra note 7, at p. 361, 55 N. E. at p. 920.
"'Hammond, J., (i898) American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers Union
(1898, C. C. N. D. Ohio, E. D.) go Fed. 598, 6oo. And see Thurmmond t,.
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At an earlier day, then, the association name signalized a number of
human beings, the members, "protruding themselves into a court of
justice" in manner and form as officious intruders upon an existing
tradition current in our common law dating from well toward the
beginnings of our political institutions. We sanction that tradition
to-day under the guise of the formula that an association, unincorpo-
rated, is not a "legal entity separate and distinct from its members."
The same historical doctrine of corporate franchises might be offered
to explain the beginnings of the rule which is announced in those cases
which declare that a deed or testamentary disposition to an unincorpo-
rated association in the association name is void for want of "capacity"
in the unincorporated association. Such explanation would be true
to history especially in the cases involving acquisition of property by
unincorporated communities "as such. '48 The writer is reluctant how-
ever, to offer such explanation for the American cases on this subject.
The two cases, Jackson v. Corey and Hornbeck v. Westbrook (referred
to in note 3o), which appear to be the foundation for the property rule
in question, appear too clearly to approach the problem as one of uncer-
tainty of designation or description of the grantee or beneficiary. Con-
sideration of the "capacity" which is had in those cases is fairly clearly
collateral. There is not sufficient evidence, in the opinion of the writer,
to warrant the statement that the court was influenced in its decisions
by the idea that to receive property in an association name was an
exclusively corporate power and privilege requiring a sovereign grant.
On the evidence it seems most consistent to say that the formula
that "an unincorporated association is not a legal entity separate from
its members" has been employed by the courts only as a method of
statement of the real reasons for their decisions. That in the actions
cases the real reason for the decisions is the conclusion of the courts
that to sue or be sued in the association name are exclusively "corpor-
ate" legal relations, which will not be accorded to the associates in
the absence of grant from the sovereign. That in the property cases,
so far as the formula is used, it is used to state the independent con-
clusion of those courts that dispositions of property to the association
name do not satisfy the requisite of certainty of grantee or beneficiary.
Although this conclusion does not require one to go further and
assert that the formula can be no more than a method of stating a
reason existing independently of the formula, it seems well to do so.
It must be noted that it is no sufficient reason in itself to say that an
unincorporated association cannot sue or be sued in its association
name, or that it cannot acquire property thereby because "it is not a
Cedar Spring Baptist Church (Igoo) iso Ga. 816, 36 S. E. 221. The question is
not one of "right" 'to sue and be sued, but of the associate's power to sue and
their liability to be sued; see Lord Shand in the Taff Vale case, supra note 3,
at p. 441.
' See Holdsworth, loc. cit. supra note 41.
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legal entity separate from its members," because "it is not an entity
known to the law." To verify this requires consideration of two
questions: (i) Is it sufficient to say that an unincorporated associa-
tion is not a legal entity separate from its members simply because it
is not incorporated? (2) Is it sufficient reason in itself to hold that
unincorporated associations cannot sue or be sued or own property
because they are not legal entities separate and distinct from the mem-
bers? The first question must be answered in the negative. "Legal
entity" is not an attribute applicable exclusively to corporations. If
in a given case concerning an unincorporated association a court finds
it to be a covenient way of stating its decision it may employ "legal
entity." On such occasion it will declare that the association is a legal
entity.49 On another occasion, having come to a given decision on
independent grounds, the court may declare, even as respects a corpora-
tion, that the association is not a "legal entity," or to use the orthodox
terminology of corporation law: it "disregards the corporate entity." 50
The particular decision to be stated will, of course, determine the form
of statement to be employed, and whether either one of these forms is
employed rather than some third method will be determined by con-
venience and not by any a priori non-applicability of "legal entity" to
unincorporated associations. In addition to the actual practice of
courts of using "legal entity" on occasion with reference to unincor-
porated associations the conclusion that it is not exclusively "corporate"
is made the more evident by considering the second question, namely,
is it a sufficient reason in itself for the decisions that an unincorporated
association cannot sue or be sued, or own property because it is not a
"legal entity"? How does "legal entity" come into these cases at all?
Apparently as follows: The court conceives of the suit in the common
name as being by or against the "association" and not by or against the
members, and a deed or testamentary disposition to the association
name as being to the "association" and not to the members. This
conception is natural, the appearance of "legal entity" in these cases is
natural. It is consequent upon certain of our mental processes. We
first perceive the associates, human beings, engaged in a common enter-
prise with a common purpose. Thereupon, in our consideration of
them we reify them as a group, and we get "it," "the association as
such." By this instinctive process "the association" becomes an entity,
a thing separate and distinct from the associates. Before this process
"Walker v. Wait (1878) -5 Vt. 668; State v. Krasher (1908) 170 Ind. 43, 47,
83 N. E. 498, 500: ...... in thus speaking the courts have referred to partner-
ships as legal entities merely as a term of accommodation, where there was under
consideration some question as to the rights of partners inter se, or of the
derivative rights of creditors growing out of the equities of the partners ......
(italics mine.)
' See First National Bank v. Trebein (1898) 59 Ohio St. 316, 326, 52 N. E.
834, 837.
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takes place we concern ourselves with a number of individuals, the
associates. We observe that these individuals have assumed for them-
selves a common or association name by which to distinctly designate
themselves in their associate activities. Starting with the premise
that these associates can sue or be sued and can acquire property, the
real issue in our cases would seem to be whether they can sue or be
sued or acquire property in a particular manner and form, namely by
the common name which they have assumed. To say that they cannot
because an unincorporated association is not a legal entity indicates
that the process of reification has taken place, that the individuals
are no longer the immediate focusof observation, but instead, that the
"association as such" is under consideration. This instinctive process
leaves us with an "association," an entity separate and distinct from its
members. But the formula which we have is that such an association
is not a legal entity separate from its members, it is not an entity known
to the law. This would seem to indicate that for some cause a second
process has operated to destroy the original creation,-a process in the
nature of things dependent upon the effect of the first-that there has
been an abrogation of the entity heretofore created. Why? If for no
independent reason, then for no reason at all, for quite obviously to
do so because we do so is no reason for so doing. To repeat: If
any court has decided that the associates cannot sue or be sued in their
common name, or that they cannot receive property thereby without
having come to the conclusion that such ought to be the decision on
independent grounds, on grounds independent of the formula that an
unincorporated association is not a legal entity separate from its mem-
bers, there is no reason, no justification for the court for having made
such decision. Such court has followed the natural bent of thinking
of the associates as an entity, of thinking of the group "as such ;" but
it has brushed aside the creation. Why? The only answer in such
case is: because it has.
If these observations are accepted there is some doubt as to exactly
what the supreme court is looking for in the Coronado case in search-
ing statutory provisions touching labor unions for "affirmative legal
recognition of the existence" of unincorporated labor unions. Certainly
statutory authority is not essential to give them the existence" of a
"legal entity." As pointed out, that in itself is an idea to be acquired
by the court by its own mental processes. Apparently emphasis is to
be placed upon their "recognition" by statutory enactments wherefore
the court can gather sufficient sovereign authoiization for ascribing an
exclusively corporate legal relation to the members, namely, liability to
be sued in their association name.51
If then sovereign prerogative to grant "corporate" rights be the ulti-
Quaere, if this doctrine is followed, may not partnerships, organized under
the Uniform Partnership Act, sue and be sued in the firm name?
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mate, independent and real reason for our general rule of non-suability,
and the provocation for declaring that an unincorporated association
is not a legal entity, when the associates appear as a party litigant in
their association name, will our present social structure be wrecked by
disregarding the tradition? To modernize the question, would it be too
great usurpation by the courts of powers of the legislature? We have
noted that the rule now hangs only on a pleading of abatement in most
of the states. If the courts will establish individual immunity to stock-
holders just as if they were a de jure corporation although the members
have substantially failed to perform the conditions for "incorpora-
tion"--this in the name of de facto corporations; if the courts will
legislate the doctrine of no collateral attack applicable to many ultra
vires transactions of corporations; if plaintiffs may sue in their asso-
ciation name, although unincorporated, when the defendant has con-
tracted with them in that name, on the doctrine of "corporation by
estoppel," estoppel to deny legal existence as a corporation, as obtains
in many jurisdictions ;5 -if these doctrines have been made up out of
whole cloth and cut from this traditional bolt by our courts, and legisla-
tures allow them to stand, for the welfare and convenience of our-
selves, it is submitted that the courts have been a little "fastidious,'"5
in the light of the inconvenience caused by it and its corollary, in con-
tinuing to impose the general rule which we have under consideration.
However, conceding that the general rule may, in net result, give
only cause for pleading in abatement if violated, and has no more
" See NoTE (1922) 7 MINN. L. Rxv. 42. Cf. Heaston v. Cincin. & F. W. R. R.
(1861) 16 Ind. 275.
"Johnson & Co. v. Smith, supra note 20. And see Wannamaker, J., in
Fowler v. Cleveland (1919) IOO Ohio St. 158, '59, 126 N. E. 72.
Most cases which treat the suability question as one of certainty of parties (see
supra note I) would appear to be consistent with the method of approach of the
courts in cases involving contracts, deeds, etc. They generally rely on Chitty
who says that for "C. D. and Company" to appear as a party litigant is uncer-
tainty. Whether he means by this that a "non-joinder" of parties is indicated
is not clear. Most of the cases resting on the ground of certainty are in such
form.
The growth of modern statutes authorizing suits in the common name would
seem to indicate that certainty was not a serious problem in these cases. If
rules of service, proof of cause, judgment and execution are ascertained there
would seem to be no special necessity for further certainty. Cf. Karges Co. v.
Amalgamated Woodworkers' Union (i9o5) 165 Ind. 421, 423, 15 N. E. 877, 878.
The foregoing rules would also doubtless apply to statutes authorizing suits
against unincorporated associations by their association name, these statutes
generally providing for service upon any associate. See for examples: Ala.
Code, 19o7, sec. 25o6; Calif. C. C. P. 9115, sec. 388; Colo. Rev. Sts. 19o8,
sec. 14; Idaho, 2 Comp. Laws, 1919, sec. 6656; Mont. Rev. Code, 1921, sec.
9o89; Minn. Gen. Sts. 1913, sec. 7689; Neb. Comp. Sts. 1923, sec. 8537; N. Y.
C. C. P. 1876, sec. 9ig; Md. Code, 1911, Art. 23, sec. 301; Vt Gen. Laws, 1917,
sec. 5720; Mich. Comp. Laws, 1915, sees. 12, 363; similar provisions exist in
other states.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
serious basis than above suggested, are there serious problems concern-
ing service of process, proof of plaintiff's case, rendition of judgment,
or of execution thereon, that render it impracticable to abandon the rule
without statutory provisions for these matters? It may be admitted
that these problems present more serious difficulties.
As respects service of process, however, the general statement will
probably not be contested that "due process" is satisfied if defendants
are given reasonable notice and opportunity to defend. Personal notice
is not necessary.54 A common law rule is to be noted, however, to
the 'effect that all "joint" contractors or partners must have been duly
served before plaintiff could take any judgment. If one of such defen-
dants were non-resident, plaintiff was apparently helpless unless out-
lawry proceedings were had. Whether such proceedings were available
in civil action is doubtful.55 To obviate such failure of justice, "joint
debtor" statutes have been passed in one form or another in most states.
These statutes generally authorize service of process on any one of
the "joint" debtors or partners. The judgment appears to be valid,
within the doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff,58 at least to bind the "joint"
property within the state.57  the judgment is apparently invalid to
impose any individual responsibility upon the non-resident debtor or
partner not duly served within the state nor voluntarily appearing. 8
These statutes are quite uniformly restricted, however, to defendants
"jointly indebted on a contract." In such statutes only does there
appear to be any statutory assistance in our problem of service. These
rules are instructive, however.
In states where statutes prescribing such service do not obtain, and
in cases where they are not applicable, how shall service be made? The
Chancellor made a rule for himself in the case of representative actions,
based on the idea of reasonable notice, to the effect that service upon
the representatives in the suit would be sufficient to authorize a decree
" See 35 L. R. A. (m. s.) 292, note, and NOTES (19o6) 20 HAxv. L. REV. 58.
' Blessing v. McLinden (1911) 81 N. J. L. 379, 79 Atl. 347; Nathanson v.
Spitz (895) 19 R.'I. 70, 3r At]. 690.
"' (877) 95 U. S. 754.
"See Sugg v. Thornton (1889) 132 U. S. 524, 1o Sup. Ct. 163; Esteve Bros.
6- Co. v. Harrell (i921, C. C. A. 5th) 272 Fed. 382; Freeman's note, 44 Am.
Dec. 570. See also Scott, Jurisdiction over Non-Residents Doing Business Within
a State (1919) 32 HARv. L. IEv. 871.
5 'Moredock v. Kirby (19o2, C. C. W. D. Ky.) 118 Fed. 18o; Caldwell v.
Armour (1899, Del.) I Pennewill, 545, 43 AtI. 517; Cabanne v. Graf (1902)
87 Minn. 550, 92 N. W. 461; and see Flexner v. Farson (1919) 248 U. S. 289,
39 Sup. Ct. 97; Freeman, (1873) sec. 52o a. See also 43 L. R. A. (N. s.) 540,
note, reviewing decisions on these statutes, and Hall v. Lanning (1875) 95 U. S.
16o. Whether judgment shall be entered in form against all the defendants
including those non-resident, or only against those who are duly served within
the state and those who voluntarily appear, seems to be only a question of formal
compliance with the particular statute.
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binding all the associates respecting the common property.
59 And
again, in a proceeding in a common law court, without statutory assist-
ance, service upon the principal officer of the association has been held
adequate.8 0 Such conclusion would seem to carry out fairly the require-
ment of reasonable notice in light of the examples already noted. It
is workable. It should be sufficient to authorize judgment effective
in the first instance against the common fund. It is consistent with
the policy of the "joint debtor" statutes referred to above, as well as
that reflected in the statutory provisions of the most of the states which
authorize suits against the associates in their common name.
This conclusion will raise the question whether the basis of individual
responsibility of the associates is changed. If plaintiff, by using their
common name, names each and all of the associates, is proof of his
cause of action altered in case of partnership associations? The jural
liabilities of partners are imposed by law. They are imposed because
they, by their contract, become co-entrepreneurs.
6 The powers of
co-partner A are co-extensive with what is the common and usual
practice of entrepreneurs generally in prosecuting that particular kind
of business in which the firm is engaged. His powers need not be
referred to authority from his associates as principals before a partner-
ship transaction can be established. If plaintiff proves that co-partner
A's transaction with him was accomplished by A in behalf of the asso-
ciation as distinguished from being on his (A's) own personal account,
and is a transaction within the common practice of such business as
stated above, plaintiff's right against all the associates is established.
There is an "association responsibility." (This is subject, of course,
to the qualification that plaintiff did not know of any agreed limitation
on A's powers contained in the partnership agreement.) If, this is
true where plaintiff sues all the partners by their several names, it is
hard to see how this basis of responsibility would be changed by suing
all the associates in their common name which is applicable to them for
the given transaction.
In the case of non-partnership associations, on the other hand, the
jural liabilities of the associates are determined by the rules of agency
' See'cases supra, note 14.
' Slaughter v. Baptist Society (1912, Tex. Civ. App.) 15o S. W. 224. See also
Fitzpatrick v. Rutter, supra note 14. And in the Coronado case, 259 U. S. at p.
392, 42 Sup. Ct. at p. 577, Taft, C. J., states: " ... we conclude that the Inter-
national Union, the District No. 21, and the 27 local unions were properly made
parties defendant here and properly served by process on their principal offlcers."
(italics mine.)
'It will be conceded that a more orthodox statement of the partnership
relation is that it involves the mutual relation of principal and agent, that each
partner is the agent for the co-partners in the ordinary purposes of the trade.
As Justice Gray points out, however, in Meehan v. Valentine (1892) 145 U. S.
611, 12 Sup. Ct. 972, this is only a statement of the consequence of the relation
and not the reason for the legal relations of partners.
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law. Each associate must consent within those rules before a transac-
tion is binding upon that one. 2 All of the associates must consent
within those rules before an "association transaction" can be consum-
mated.613 This is plaintiff's case when the associates are named in their
several names. Is it changed by using the common or association
name? If suit is brought against the associates by their association
name, which names all of the associates, is it not to establish an "asso-
ciation responsibility" and will not plaintiff therefore have to prove the
responsibility of all on the basis of agency law as a condition of using
the common name? The New York courts have answered this ques-
tion in the affirmative under the New York statute. 4 The plaintiff
cannot employ the statutory method unless there is proof of responsi-
bility of all the members. "It is essential to a right of recovery in
such a case that the cause of action was one for which an action might
be maintained against the 30,000 members of the United Association.
'
This would seem to be the proper construction of an action in such
form in absence of statute, understanding "members" to mean those
who were associated at the time the cause of action accrued. 6 If this is
'Ash v. Gade (I88I) 97 Pa. 493.
'Unquestionably those members, less than all, who do authorize the transac-
tion are themselves personally responsible.
'McCabe v. Goodfellow (1892) I33 N. Y. 89, 30 N. E. 728.
"Schouten v. Alpine (915) 215 N. Y. 225, 232, 1o9 N. E. 244, 246; accord:
Coney v. Brennan (1917, Spec. T.) 167 N. Y. Supp. 903.
'If a member dies or voluntarily withdraws from the defendant association
after plaintiff's cause of action has accrued against the associates but before
proceedings commenced, question will arise whether plaintiff can proceed against
the associates in their association name. There has been a change in the
associates. In such case however, the withdrawing member still remains respon-
sible both as respects his share, whatever it is, in the common property and as
respects his private purse (assuming death does not extinguish his duty as a
"joint" debtor). He, or his representative, is still responsible to plaintiff on
an "association responsibility," and it seems that the association name should still
include him for the purposes of this litigation. The question of service of
process should not make for a different result in such case. Under the "joint
debtor" statutes, presumably if one joint debtor agreed with his co-debtors that
he should be responsible alone, with no acquiescence by the creditor, it would
hardly be argued that service on any one according to the statute would not be
sufficient although it would be if such bargain had not taken place between the
debtors. It is recognized however, that in cases where there has been a dissolu-
tion of a partnership that there is some conflict of authority whether one partner
can receive service for all after dissolution. It is submitted that there should
be no such difficulty where the judgment goes upon an "association responsibility"
against only the common fund in the first instance and against the members'
private purses only in supplementary proceedings after return of execution
unsatisfied. The foregoing observations should apply to associations whether
of the non-partnership class or partnership class, and whether, by the member-
ship agreement, the associate purposes are to be carried on regardless of changes
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the purpose and effect of the suit against the common name and such
is the proof requirement for plaintiff's cause of action, it seems obvious
that no change is made in proof of plaintiff's cause of action facilitating
his establishing an "association responsibility" at any sacrifice of protec-
tion to the associates. In this connection it is to be further remem-
bered, however, that plaintiff need not do more than satisfy the rules
of the law of agency applicable in such cases. He may have recourse
to the constitution-agreement of the members, their by-laws, their
resolutions, and in general to the objective standards of agency which
we label "scope of authority" and "incidental purposes" of an asso-
ciation of any particular type in question.67  As to what they are as
respects any particular association this article is not concerned. Let
it be noted only that there is no striking innovation suggested, in
in membership, or whether they are to terminate upon death or withdrawal of a
member.
If a new member has been admitted into the defendant association, that is
into the membership agreement of the association, subsequently to accrual of
plaintiff's cause of action, it would seem expedient and sufficient to cause sugges-
tion of his non-responsibility to be made upon the record, and his contribution
to the common property reserved in the judgment. Let him be treated as a
non-member pro hac vice.
If the firm name is being used as plaintiff on a claim in favor of the asso-
ciation, and such claim against the defendant accrued before the death or with-
drawal of an associate plaintiff, certainly the association name can be used
in case of a non-partnership association where the interest of such member
passes by beneficial survivorship to the remaining members. The association
name will properly designate all parties in interest in the "association claim"
against defendant. If the association is a partnership from which the member
withdraws and there is no "dissolution" by the withdrawal it would seem that
the association name would still be proper to designate the proper parties
in interest on the partnership claim against defendant if the withdrawing
member still retains his interest in the claim as between himself and his
former co-partners and as between himself and the defendant. If he has sold
his interest to his former co-partners it is likewise hard to see why the associa-
tion name does not properly designate all parties in interest on the "association
claim" against defendant. If the partner's withdrawal effects a "dissolution"
of the firm, obviously there is little advantage in using the association name for
the surviving partner can sue in his own name in that capacity.
If a new member has been added to the plaintiff association, that is, admitted
into the membership agreement of the plaintiff associates obviously, in either
class of associations, the association name properly designates the proper parties
in interest on an "association claim" against the defendant.
" See McCabe v. Goodfellow, supra note 59. "There are cases, doubtless, in
which the act done is so clearly in furtherance of the objects for which the
association was organized that all will be presumptively bound by it. When
such is not the case, consent or ratification must be proved," Sizer v. Daniels
(1873, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 66 Barb. 426, 433.
If plaintiff must prove the responsibility of all the members, but one is non-
resident, can the plaintiff use the common name? There would seem to be no
greater objection in allowing it as matter of form, than in cases under the
"joint debtor" statutes where the name of the non-resident may go into the
judgment record in form.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
allowing suit to be maintained against the common name, with service
upon a principal officer, and judgment binding in the first instance
upon the common property.
A last question arises, namely, have we changed the extent of respon-
sibility of the associates? It is submitted that we have not, and that
their ultimate responsibility is unlimited, and whether plaintiff shall
employ the method of suing the defendants in their common name
should be at his election. Statutes authorizing suits against the com-
mon name with service as above stated and providing for judgment
in such cases against the "joint property" have been construed as not
limiting ultimate responsibility. 68 Upon return of execution against
the common property unsatisfied, supplementary proceedings (a "new
action" presumably in case of those who were non-resident members)
should be available against any or all of the sui juris members subject
to process for the deficiency. Herein will the member have his day
in court as to his individual responsibility. The doctrine of "corpora-
tion by estoppel" has not been extended to take away their responsi-
bility, by the better considered authorities,69 nor can the present doctrine
of de facto corporations be said to be applicable, nor is it believed that
it is desirable to extend that doctrine in this direction, at least not until
we are ready to hold that the responsibility of partners and principals
generally are to be limited.
In conclusion:
i. It is believed that the power to sue or the liability to be sued
by their association name was denied to associates of unincorporated
'judgment against the common name does not authorize execution against the
members individually; Wyman, Moses & Co. v. Stewart (1868) 42 Ala. 163;
McCoy v. Watson. (1874) 51 Ala. 466; 2 Bates, Partnership (1888) sec. lO64.
But the members' responsibility, otherwise than as respects liability to suit in their
common name, are said to remain unchanged: see Huth v. Humboldt & Stammn
(i8gi) 61 Conn. 227, 23 Atl. 1084; Mayhcw & Isbell Co. v. Valley Wells Assoc.
(1919, Tex. Civ. App.) 216 S. W. 225. The members may still be sued in their
individual names: Littleton v. Wells & McConas Council (1904) 98 Md. 453,
56 Atl. 798; Haralson v. Campbell (1879) 63 Ala. 278; and the two forms of
action may be joined: Detroit Light Guard Band v. First Mich. Ind. Inf. Band
(0903) 134 Mich. 598, 96 N. W. 934. If there is sufficient service on each
associate within the state, or he voluntarily appears, in absence of express
statutory restriction, it would seem that execution might issue against the
member's private purse on the single judgment. Stout v. Baker (1884) 32 Kan.
1i3. Statutory provision for service on any associate and judgment against the
common name with execution thereon to issue against the associates' private
purse as well as against the common fund has been held to be "due process."
Appeal of Baylor (1913) 93 S. C. 414, 77 S. E. 59. See also Patch Mfg. Co. V.
Capeless (19o6) 79 Vt. I, 63 Atl. 938. That supplementary proceedings may
be had after return on the judgment unsatisfied from the common fund seems
clear. Cox vz. Harris (1872) 48 Ala. 538; Ruth v. Lowrey io Neb. 26o; and
see Anderson v. Wilson (i9og) 142 Iowa, 158, 12o N. W. 677; Hawkins v.
Lasley (1883) 4o Ohio St 37; Patch Mfg. Co. v. Capeless, supra.
't NoTEs (1922) 7 MInN. L. Rxv. 42, 44.
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associations by the courts for the reason that they considered such
attempts a usurpation of corporate franchises, which must lie in grant
from the sovereign.
2. That the formula of the present day cases that unincorporated
associations cannot sue or be sued because they are not legal entities
separate from their members is but a method of statement employed
to give effect to this real reason. That so far as present day courts
are not moved to their decision in accord with the general rule on this
or some other independent ground there is no reason or justification
for the decision-that it is no reason in itself why the associates cannot
sue or be sued in their association name to say that an unincorporated
association is not a legal entity separate from its members.
3. That the present status of the general rule is that of a technical
matter of form in our procedure, and that it is cause of unnecessary
inconvenience.
4. That it can well be abolished by the courts of their own motion
and suits allowed to be brought in the association name.
5. That service of process upon a principal officer should be suffi-
cient to authorize judgment and execution thereon in the first instance
against the common property, with supplementary proceedings there-
after (or a new action in case of the non-resident members), against
any members individually who are sui juris and subject to service of
process for any deficiency upon such execution.
